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The prevalence of crime among illegal immigrants in the Netherlands appears to have 
risen. Primary and secondary analyses of police data showed that the involvement in 
crime among illegal immigrants (aged 12 to 25) reflects the patterns of delinquency 
among legal migrants of comparable age and country of origin. At present, the (rising) 
crime rate among illegal immigrants is perceived as (an increase of) „survival crime‟ 
that is caused by „marginalization‟, i.e., a lack of „social capital‟. The evidence 
presented in this study indicates that the relation between „social capital‟ and 
„delinquency‟ is not unambiguous, and suggests that additional explanatory variables 





The presence of relatively large numbers of legal and illegal immigrants has become a 
permanent feature of most western societies. At present, the number of illegal 
immigrants in the Netherlands is estimated at approximately 150,000 (Leerkes et al. 
2004; Engbersen et al. 2002). According to official statistics, the registered population 




The heightened immigration to the Netherlands has gone hand in hand with an 
increase in social research in which immigrants are the objects of inquiry (cf. Portes 
1995). Various researchers have investigated delinquency among immigrants, in the 
Netherlands (cf. Junger 1990, Werdmölder 1997, Van San 1998, Bovenkerk 1999) 
and internationally (cf. De Haen-Marschall 1997, Tonry 1997, Waters 1999). The 
research invariably shows that many, but not all, immigrant communities are 
disproportionately represented in police statistics. The research also shows that 
migrants tend to commit specific types of crimes depending on their country of origin.   
As the opportunities to migrate to the Netherlands by permission of the Dutch 
government have diminished since the 1970s, the number of illegal immigrants has 
probably risen (Doomernik 2001). In recent years, Engbersen et al. have paid ample 
attention to the life strategies of illegal immigrants in the Netherlands (cf. Engbersen 
1996, Engbersen et al. 1995a, 1995b, 1999, 2001, 2002, Burgers et a1. 1999). They 
found systematic differences in the extent to which illegal immigrants from differing 
countries of origin come into contact with the police because of criminal offences. 
They also gathered data that indicate that the prevalence of crime among illegal 
immigrants has increased since 1997 (Engbersen et al 2002; Leerkes et al 2004). 
The results of the research on legal and illegal immigrants suggest that there 
are similarities in the extent to which legal and illegal immigrants from a particular 
country of origin come into contact with the police as a result of committing certain 
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criminal offences. If the prevalence of a type of crime is relatively high for a certain 
category of legal immigrants, it also appears elevated among illegal immigrants from 
the same country. Such similarities have not been examined systematically, and have 
been, for the greater part, neglected in explaining illegal immigrants‟ delinquency 
patterns (as well as the patterns of delinquency among legal immigrants). This is 
unfortunate, as such similarities may indicate, as I will argue below, that the current 
explanation of the criminal involvement of illegal immigrants needs to be altered or 
supplemented with explanations that are current in the field of ethnicity and crime 
(and visa versa).   
The aim of this study is to fill this gap through a systematic comparison of the 
crime rates among eleven groups of legal immigrants with (indicators of) the crime 
rates of comparable illegal immigrants. Using a primary analysis of police data on 
illegal immigrants and a secondary analysis of similar data on legal immigrants, I 
investigated the extent to which the crime rate among illegal immigrants reflects the 
criminal involvement of legal immigrants of comparable age and country of origin. 
Furthermore, I examined the extent to which illegal immigrants commit similar 
offences to those of their legal compatriots.  
Firstly, I will describe in more detail how delinquency among illegal 
immigrants is currently understood. In the next section, I will explain the origin of the 
data and the research method. I will then present the empirical results and discuss 
some objections against the validity of the data. Finally, I will relate the findings to 
some individual examples of delinquent illegal immigrants that are reported in the 
literature, and address the theoretical interpretation of the evidence.  
  
 
The differential opportunity structure 
 
Engbersen and van der Leun (1995, 2001) found systematic differences in the extent 
to which illegal migrants of differing nationalities came into contact with the police as 
suspects of criminal offences. Suspicions of involvement in criminal offences 
accounted for 32% of the apprehended Eastern Europeans, 54% of the Algerians, and 
65% of the Moroccans, whereas illegal Turks had only a 4% chance of being 
apprehended as suspected criminals. Engbersen and Van der Leun explained these 
differences using the notion of the „differential opportunity structure‟ (cf. Cloward 
and Ohlin 1960). They reasoned that, depending on their ethnic group, illegal 
immigrants have differential access to (1) formal institutions of the welfare state, such 
as the labour market, education, unemployment benefits, housing, and health care, (2) 
informal institutions such as the network of family and friends, and the informal 
economy, and (3) criminal „institutions‟ or circuits.  
Over the last decade, governmental policies with regard to illegal residence 
have become much stricter in the Netherlands (cf. ROB 1998). In order to obstruct 
illegal residence, several measures, such as the Law on Identification (1994), the Law 
on Prevention of Marriages of Convenience (1994) and the Law on Labour Aliens 
(1995), were adopted. The main piece of restrictive policy is the so-called Linking 
Act, implemented in 1998. Since this law came into operation, it has become difficult 
for people who lack a residence permit to obtain access to collective arrangements of 
the welfare state. At present, unlike many categories of legal immigrants, illegal 
immigrants are not entitled to work on the official labour market, and cannot receive 
state scholarships, profit from unemployment benefits, or rent houses and apartments 




Although the above-mentioned policies are not always carried out to the letter 
of the law, there is no doubt that access to formal institutions, particularly the official 
labour market and the system of welfare provisions, was radically reduced in the 
course of the nineties (Van der Leun 2001, 2002). Therefore, a supportive network is 
increasingly necessary for survival in the Netherlands (Engbersen 1996: 98). 
There are indications that the prevalence of crime among illegal immigrants 
has increased since the implementation of these exclusionary measures.  Analyses of 
police statistics from 1997-2003 show that the category of minor offences (such as 
shoplifting, burglary, swindling, false documents) as a reason for apprehension 
increased from 18.2% in 1997 to 28.4% in 2003 (Leerkes et al. 2004, Engbersen et al. 
2002). 
Governmental policies pertain to illegal residence as such, and are not 
supposed to treat immigrants differently once they have been defined as „illegal‟. 
Therefore, during a certain policy regime, illegal immigrants‟ survival chances vary 
depending on the human and social capital of the illegal immigrant and the 
(immigrant) communities in the Netherlands on which the immigrant depends. Well-
established immigrant communities are assumed to provide ample access to the 
second dimension of the opportunity structure, such as the informal ethnic economy, 
provided illegal immigrants have social contacts with members of the ethnic 
community and are able to receive their support (Staring and Engbersen 2001). Legal 
immigrants may also provide illegal immigrants with some (indirect) access to the 
first dimension of the opportunity structure by lending or renting out health insurance 
cards or fiscal numbers (cf. Engbersen et al. 1999) 
Engbersen and van der Leun have also asserted that the chances of illegal 
immigrants becoming engaged in crime may be linked with features of criminal 
circuits. For example, in Rotterdam, North African illegal immigrants appeared to 
make better „employees‟ to occupy the lower echelons of the sale of hard drugs to 
French „drug tourists‟, because many North Africans speak French (Van der Leun 
2002). Nevertheless, the role of immigrant communities in providing access to 
criminal circuits has not been taken into consideration so far.
iii
 In most publications, 
there is a tendency to understand illegal immigrants‟ crime involvement in a „negative 
way‟, i.e., as a final option when no other choices remain. The position of illegal 
Turks, who are assumed to be quasi-integrated in the Turkish community, is often 
contrasted with that of illegal Moroccans, who commit „survival crime‟ (cf. De Haan 
1983, 1994) because they “often have to manage on their own” (Engbersen and Van 
der Leun 2001b, 63): 
Social relations with the ethnic community can be conceived of as a form of 
social capital, i.e., the capacity of individuals to mobilize certain resources from a 
community or social network they are a part of (Bourdieu 1986, Portes 1995, 
Coleman 1990). Engbersen has asserted that delinquency by illegal immigrants is 
caused by marginalization that is attended with a lack of social capital: “This study 
made very clear that illegal immigrants with little social capital commit crimes in 
order to survive” (Engbersen 2001, 245). 
 It was difficult to develop precise hypotheses from the „marginalisation thesis‟ 
that could be tested using the evidence presented here. The data pertained to the group 
level and could not be taken as indicators for the amount of „social capital‟ of 
individual illegal immigrants. However, the available evidence and literature indicate, 
as I will explain below, that the current explanation is incomplete.  
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Data and research method 
 
The data on legal immigrants were taken from the Herkenningsdienstsysteem (HKS), 
a database in which the Dutch police register suspects. The HKS system contains all 
official reports by the police, which describe offences (type of offence, date, place) as 
well as features of the suspects (date of birth, sex, nationality, country of birth). The 
data on apprehensions of illegal immigrants were taken from the Vreemdelingen 
Administratie Systeem (VAS), which is designed to register all foreigners that require 
explicit permission from the Dutch authorities to enter and/or to reside in the 
Netherlands. All apprehended illegal immigrants – apprehended by the regular police 
or by specialized divisions such as the alien police – are documented in this system as 
well. Often, it is the Vreemdelingen Administratie Systeem which determines whether 
a foreigner can be apprehended as an „illegal immigrant‟ in the first place, because 
prior to their apprehension, illegal immigrants are not registered, are already listed as 
illegal aliens because of previous apprehensions, or are known as formerly legal 
foreigners with expired residence permits. In the Vreemdelingen Administratie 
Systeem, possible additional grounds for apprehension besides illegal residence – such 
as working without a working permit, using public transport without paying the fare, 
drug offences, and theft – are also filed. These registrations of possible offences and 
misdemeanours are excerpts from official reports, which are filed in the 
Herkenningsdienstsysteem.   
The data were initially gathered for two separate studies: (1) research on 
delinquency among young immigrants (aged 12 to 25) from relatively recently arrived 
groups of legal migrants (Kromhout and van San 2003), and (2) research on illegal 
immigrants of all ages (Leerkes et al. 2004). For this study a secondary analysis of the 
former dataset was combined with a primary analysis of the latter. Since the first 
research was limited to young immigrants, and comparable research on older legal 
immigrants is not available in the Netherlands, we were obliged to focus on young 
immigrants. In addition, investigation was limited to eleven (non-western) immigrant 
communities which are relatively large in the Netherlands: Morocco, Turkey, 
Surinam, the (former) Soviet Union, the (former) Republic of Yugoslavia, China, 
Somalia, Iran, Iraq, and Afghanistan (see Table 1).
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Police registration practices hampered a straightforward comparison of the 
datasets, because residence status is not documented in the Herkenningsdienstsysteem, 
and legal immigrants cannot be distinguished clearly from illegal immigrants. 
Kromhout and van San estimated the number of suspects with residence permits by 
eliminating all foreign-born suspects who told the police they did not reside in the 
Netherlands from their analyses. As the complete dataset on illegal immigrants was 
placed at my disposal, I was able to eliminate illegal immigrants from the analyses of 
Kromhout and van San with greater precision. First, using the Vreemdelingen 
Administratie Systeem data, I calculated per country of birth the total number of 
illegal immigrants that were apprehended for offences and were between 18 and 25 
years old. I subtracted these numbers from the number of „legal‟ suspects reported by 
Kromhout and van San (data adjustment A). In this way, I corrected for the maximum 
distortion in their figures. Next, I calculated per country of birth the number of illegal 
immigrants that were in the required age category, were apprehended for offences, 
and had told the police their residential addresses in the Netherlands (data adjustment 
B). The best correction of Kromhout and Van San‟s overestimation of the number of 
suspects with residence permits probably lies between the adjustments.
v
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The ‘quantity’ of delinquency 
 
The data in Table 1, which were taken from Kromhout and Van San, are ordered 
according to the size of the population in the age group 18 to 25. For methodological 
reasons, the age group 12 to 18 was excluded.
vi
 Indicators for the crime rate per 
country of birth are shown in the right-hand columns. The crime rate was defined as 
the percentage of a population registered in the course of a year as suspected of at 
least one criminal offence. The average crime rate was the average of the crime rates 
for 1999 and 2000.
vii
 The crime rate correlated with ethnicity. Whereas the crime rate 
approached ten percent for countries such as Morocco, the (former) Republic of 
Yugoslavia, Somalia, and the former Soviet Union, it was (less than) three percent for 
Turkey, Afghanistan, and China. The data adjustments were particularly significant 
for the former Soviet Union (the average crime rate fell from 10.7 to 6.7 and 8.6) and, 
to a lesser extent, the former Republic of Yugoslavia (the average crime rate dropped 
from 9.6 to 8.1 and 9.0).  
It is important to note that delinquency is relatively widespread among 
youngsters in some immigrant communities, especially since the data relate to the 
total population in the age category concerned - male and female.
 viii
 A crime rate of 
10% for the total population between 18 and 25 years of age may indicate that 
approximately one-fifth of the male population is annually registered as suspected of 
criminal offences (cf. Van San and Leerkes 2001).  
 
[Insert table 1] 
 
Table 2 shows the number of apprehensions of illegal immigrants. In order to reduce 
the influence of random variation – the number of illegal immigrants aged between 18 
and 25 was quite small for some nationalities - a somewhat longer period of time was 
used (1998-2001).
ix
 For instance, 3008 apprehensions of illegal Moroccans took place 
in these four years.
x
 About 35% of these concerned suspects of criminal offences, 
while for Turkey, this figure was only 16.2%. 
xi
 The remaining apprehensions 
concerned illegal labour, using public transport without paying the fare, illegal 
inhabitation of apartments, et cetera. In the Netherlands, these offences are not 
mentioned in criminal law.  
The total number of illegal immigrants per country of birth was unknown. 
Only the total number of illegal immigrants, regardless of their country of origin, has 
been estimated in previous studies.
xii
 Therefore, it was not possible to calculate 
precise crime rates per country of birth, as we did for legal immigrants. Instead, I used 
the percentage of apprehensions for offences as an indicator of the prevalence of 
delinquency (see also Engbersen and van der Leun 1995, 2001). This crude measure 
suggested that delinquency is much more prevalent among illegal immigrants from 
Ethiopia, Surinam, Iran, Yugoslavia, and Morocco, than among illegal Chinese, 
Turks, and Iraqis. The former Soviet Union, Afghanistan, and Somalia occupy a 
position in the middle.  
 
[Insert table 2] 
 
In the absence of precise crime rates, it was impossible to determine whether illegal 
immigrants are more likely, less likely than, or as likely as legal immigrants to come 
into contact with the police because of criminal offences. What we can establish, 
using Figure 1, which plots (indicators of) the crime rates for the researched groups, is 
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that the crime rate for legal immigrants predicts the percentage of apprehensions of 
illegal compatriots on the ground of criminal offences (and visa versa). With 
residence status held constant, Ethiopian, Surinamese, Iranian and Yugoslavian 
immigrants were two to three times more likely to be registered as suspects of 
criminal offences than were immigrants from China, Turkey, and Afghanistan. Table 
3 confirms that the correlation coefficient between the two measures was positive. It 
varied between 0.34 (unweighted) and 0.74 (when the data were weighted according 
to the relative size of the immigrant groups).  
 
[Insert figure 1] 
 




The association suggested in Figure 1 is to be doubted on several grounds. Firstly, it 
may be argued that it is merely the result of Kromhout and van San‟s inability to 
eliminate illegal immigrants from their analyses with certainty: the correlation may be 
„tautological‟ in as far as both datasets include illegal immigrants. The data 
adjustments, however, do not support such an argument, as the correlation became 
somewhat stronger when was corrected for the possible inclusion of illegal 
immigrants in Kromhout and Van San‟s data (Table 3). In particular, the former 
Soviet Union‟s score became more in agreement with the general trend.     
Secondly, we should take into consideration the incomplete and selective 
character of police data (cf. Brown 1988, Levitas et al. 1996). Self-report surveys 
show that the actual prevalence of delinquency is much higher than official police 
figures suggest. This problem of the so-called „dark figure‟ is intensified by its non-
randomness: some offences do not interest the police, some offences are more easily 
discovered than others, et cetera. 
Most researchers in the field of ethnicity and crime acknowledge that police 
data represent a biased image of the „true‟ ethnic group crime rates (De Haan en 
Bovenkerk 1993). However, the selectivity of police data probably amplifies, but does 
not cause, ethnic differences regarding crime (cf. Van San and Leerkes 2001). In 
addition, there is no good alternative available. The self-reporting of offences has 
many drawbacks as well (cf. Junger 1990), and it would be nearly impossible to 
obtain access to delinquent illegal immigrants without police assistance.  
A sceptic might argue that police data do not reflect the extent to which 
immigrants are involved in crime. The scores for Turkish and Chinese immigrants 
may be low, because the offences committed by members of these groups do not 
interest the police, or happen to have a relatively low chance of discovery. In Figure 
1, two exceptions or „outliers‟ can be observed: among illegal Ethiopians and 
Surinamese, the percentage of apprehensions for offences is higher than would be 
expected based on the crime rates for their legal compatriots. Selectivity by the police 
probably explains the deviant score for Surinam (the deviant score for Ethiopia will 
be addressed later). Many Surinamese speak Dutch as a first or second language, and 
are often considered Surinamese Dutch. Therefore, Surinamese people probably are 
less likely to be apprehended for illegal residence than illegal immigrants from other 
countries. If we could control for this bias, the position of Surinam would probably be 
more in accordance with the general trend, because its score would shift vertically, i.e. 
towards the trend line. Indeed, the connection in Figure 1 becomes stronger when 
Surinam is left out of consideration (Table 3). 
For the rest, it is unlikely that the connection can be accounted for by 
assuming that the police pay more attention to some ethnic groups than to others; if 
we assume the figures are biased because the eleven immigrant communities are not 
policed similarly, the connection remains unexplained, since every point in the figure 
relates to immigrants from the same ethnic group. If the police paid more attention to 
some ethnic groups than others, the prevalence of crime among legal Turks, for 
example, might be underestimated to a greater extent than the crime rate for legal 
Moroccans. But in such a case, the percentage of illegal Turkish immigrants 
apprehended for an offence would probably be underestimated as well as compared 
with the score for illegal Moroccans. For similar reasons, it was impossible to account 
for the connection by hypothesizing that ethnic groups are involved in offences with 
differing chances of being caught.
 
Again, the score for a particular group of legal 
immigrants would be biased in the same way as the score for the corresponding group 
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of illegal immigrants: some countries of origin would move up diagonally along both 
axes, while others would move down a little, leaving the connection unchanged. 
The association also remains unaltered if it is assumed that illegal immigrants 
are invariably involved in crimes with a lower or higher chance of discovery than 
their legal counterparts: all scores would shift horizontally to the right or to the left, or 
vertically up or down. Such shifts would not alter the connection. 
 
It is unlikely that the correlation is merely due to measurement errors by Kromhout 
and Van San, or to the selectivity of police data. This assertion was supported by an 
examination of the „quality‟ of delinquency committed by legal and illegal 
immigrants.    
 
The ‘quality’ of delinquency 
 
Across all ethnic groups, most offenders are engaged in petty crimes such as theft, and 
less prevalent crimes such as rape and homicide add relatively little to the total 
number of registered offences. Such distributions are independent of the ethnicity of 
offenders. Next to such „universal‟ similarities, several examples of „criminal 
specialisation‟ have been observed. For example, suspects of Turkish descent are 
often apprehended for violence in the Netherlands, which has been connected with the 
tradition of honour vengeance in (some parts of) Turkey (cf. Bovenkerk et al. 2000). 
Turks are also known to have substantial involvement in heroine trafficking to 
Western Europe (Bovenkerk et al. 1998). Suspects from South America are frequently 
apprehended for cocaine trafficking (ISEO 2002). Offenders from Eastern Europe 
(predominantly Yugoslavs) are apprehended for theft and burglary more often than 
offenders from other countries, but rarely because of drug trafficking (Snel et al. 
2000, Van San et al. 2002). Moroccan offenders are disproportionately engaged in 
theft with violence (ISEO 2002), and marijuana trafficking (Van Gemert 1998). 
Suspects from several African countries have a much higher chance of being 
apprehended for fraud than suspects from other countries (Van San and Leerkes 
2001).  
Table 4 specifies the „quality‟ of delinquency for legal and illegal immigrants 
(for every country of origin the first row represents „legal‟ suspects, while the second 
row represents „illegal‟ suspects). It lacks data on legal Moroccans, Turks, and 
Surinamese, because Kromhout and Van San did not specify the offences for these 
groups (their research was mainly focused on delinquency among immigrant groups 
that are „new‟ to the Netherlands). In addition, Kromhout and van San have reported 
the offences for the age category 12 to 25 years old as a whole, and did not present 
separate data for suspects aged 18 to 25. Therefore, Table 4 shows the reason for  
apprehension of all suspects aged 12 to 25 (for methodological reasons, it would have 
been preferable to restrict investigation to suspects aged 18 to 25).
xiii
   
 
[Insert table 4] 
 
The data in Table 4 are in complete agreement with the literature: ethnic groups differ 
significantly, but not enormously, with regard to the types of offences their delinquent 
„members‟ commit. For legal offenders (Cramer‟s V=0.14 / p<0.00 / calculated using 
8 countries of ethnic groups), the association between country of origin and offence 
committed is somewhat weaker than for illegal offenders (Cramer‟s V=0.20; p<0.00 / 
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calculated using 11 ethnic groups), but this difference is not substantial and may be 
due to the lack of data on legal offenders from Morocco, Turkey and Surinam.    
A comparison of the way legal offenders as a whole were distributed among 
the nine categories of offences, with the corresponding distribution for illegal 
offenders, yielded Cramer‟s v=0.33 (p<0.01). This figure indicates that there is a 
significant but weak association between residence status and type of offence 
committed.
 xiv
 Further analysis showed that the type of offence committed can be 
predicted on the basis of information on the residence status of the offender (and visa 
versa) only marginally better than on the basis of mere chance.
xv
 
Many resemblances were found when legal and illegal immigrants‟ offences 
were compared in a more qualitative way. Independent of ethnicity and residence 
status, the main reason for apprehending offenders is „theft without violence‟, 
whereas sexual offences and „theft with violence‟ are relatively rare. Secondly, 
regardless of residence status, Eastern European offenders (former Republic of 
Yugoslavia and former Soviet Union) have a higher than average chance of being 
apprehended for „theft without violence‟: the police have a 63.7 and 74.4% chance of 
apprehending a legal Yugoslavian or Russian suspect because of „theft without 
violence‟, while the average chance of apprehension on these grounds is only 55.3%. 
For comparable illegal offenders, these figures are 53.0 and 60.6 compared to 45.6. 
Thirdly, more than 13% of the apprehensions of Turkish illegal offenders concern 
„violence‟, whereas for people from other countries this proportion is only 5% or 6%. 
Fourthly, more than fifty per cent of the apprehensions of illegal Surinamese 
delinquents are connected with „drugs‟. Both the elevated share of violence among 
illegal Turks, and the high Surinamese involvement in drug trafficking are in 
agreement with the results of recent research on legal Turks and Surinamese (cf. ISEO 
2000).         
 There are also significant differences. The first difference that strikes the eye 
is the diminished share of violence among illegal offenders – both against persons 
(„violence‟) and goods („vandalism‟). When Morocco, Turkey and Surinam were left 
out of consideration (since we had no data on these groups from Kromhout and van 
San), the share of these crimes among illegal offenders was only 5.9 and 2.8%, 
compared to 13.6 and 12.3% for legal offenders. Secondly, the share of the category 
„other offences‟ is elevated for illegal offenders (31.6% for illegal immigrants versus 
6.8% for legal immigrants). The latter difference is probably due to the inclusion of 
„false documents‟ in this category, the possession of which is increasingly common 
among illegal immigrants (Leerkes et al 2004: 26-27). About 87% of the 
apprehensions of illegal immigrants within the category „other offences‟ concerns this 
form of fraud (figure not presented in table). 
Separate analyses per country of origin revealed that the extent to which the 
„quality‟ of crime among illegal immigrants resembles the crime involvement among 
their legal counterparts differs somewhat per ethnic group: Cramer‟s V varies from 
0.25 for the former Soviet Union to 0.74 for Afghanistan.
xvi
 This differing extent of 
resemblance appears to be coupled with the differing size of the category „other 
offences‟ accordingly to ethnic group. Note that the latter category is especially large 
for illegal suspects from Ethiopia, Iran, and Afghanistan. Note also that these are 
precisely the three nationalities in Figure 1 (next to Surinam) for which the crime rate 
for illegal immigrants is higher than would be expected on the ground of the crime 
rate for their legal compatriots. When apprehensions for „false documents‟ were 
excluded from the analyses, the connection in Figure 1 became even stronger, 
especially Surinam was also left out of consideration.
xvii
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The observation that the patterns of delinquency among legal and illegal 
immigrants overlap, does not necessarily mean that the offences committed by legal 
and illegal immigrants are identical. It could be argued, for example, that illegal 
immigrants have an interest in participating in criminal activities of a particular type 
that are not especially risky (being on the look out during burglary), while legal co-
offenders, on the other hand, may compel illegal immigrants to carry out the more 
risky activities (entering apartments). Judicial dossiers would have to be examined to 
determine to what extent this is the case. 
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Interpreting the association 
 
Why the patterns of delinquency among legal and illegal immigrants are 
interconnected may be explained in two ways: using common explanatory variables 
(1), and by hypothesizing that the involvement in crime of legal immigrants has an 
effect on the involvement in crime of illegal immigrants and/or visa versa (2).  
As an example of the first strategy, we could speculate that a lack of social 
capital not only causes delinquency among illegal immigrants, as the marginalisation 
theory states, but also among legal immigrants. This seems a valid argument since the 
involvement of legal immigrants in the street trade of drugs, for example, has been 
understood (in part) to be an expression of a lack of social capital and a lack of 
alternative ways to be successful (Sansone 1992). However, this argument leaves the 
unresolved question why delinquency predominantly takes the form of burglary 
among immigrants from one country of origin, while it expresses itself in the form of 
violence („honour vengeance‟) in other instances. Such diversity is one of the reasons 
many researchers in the field of crime and ethnicity believe more than one variable 
should be taken into consideration (cf. De Haen-Marshall 1997, Tonry 1997, 
Kromhout and van San 2003). A review of the literature shows that different forms of 
„ethnic‟ delinquency appear to require different explanations. For example, some 
offences are connected with high levels of unemployment and social exclusion, while 
other forms of crime only become possible when an ethnic group possesses an 
extensive institutional infrastructure. In the latter circumstances delinquent 
compatriots have more opportunities to use companies to cover up certain criminal 
activities such as the wholesale trade of drugs (cf. Zaitch 2002), and to extort regular 
entrepreneurs. In addition, some ethnic groups may have access in their country of 
origin (or in diasporas) to „criminal resources‟ such as guns and drugs, which are not 
so easily obtained by members of other ethnic groups (Bovenkerk 2001). Next to such 
„structural‟ factors, cultural conditions appear to play a role as well (Van San 1998, 
Van Gemert 1998). 
Given that the patterns of delinquency among illegal immigrants reflect the 
criminal involvement of legal compatriots, and since a multitude of variables are 
usually taken into consideration to explain the differential involvement of legal 
immigrants in crime, delinquency by illegal immigrants must be influenced, either 
directly or indirectly, by such additional variables as well. Hence, it cannot be 
understood only as an expression of a lack of social capital. 
 
Relatively few illegal offenders have been interviewed. Some of these offenders have 
features that confirm the marginalization thesis. For example, in a (non-random) 
sample of 165 illegal immigrants, involvement in crime was associated with features 
indicating a marginal existence in the Netherlands: delinquent illegal immigrants 
(N=20) lacked relatives in the Netherlands more often than did non-delinquent illegal 
immigrants, and were also more often homeless (see Burgers et al. 1999: 255).  
However, the (ethnographic) literature has also reported examples of „embedded‟ 
delinquent illegal immigrants, which suggests that the relation between „ethnic 
incorporation‟ and „crime‟ is not unambiguous.  
The latter examples can be divided into two ideal types. Both illustrate the 
possibility of co-offending by illegal migrants and their legal counterparts (strategy 2) 
The first type consists of delinquent illegal immigrants who cater to the economic 
demands of (parts of) their ethnic communities - albeit in ways that are in violation of 
criminal law. This includes bicycle thieves and illegal immigrants that work in 
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informal restaurants where they sell some marijuana on the side (see Engbersen et al. 
1999, 187/8). The consumers of these goods are residents (often compatriots) of poor 
urban neighbourhoods where such illegal immigrants reside and operate. 
„Embeddedness‟ in the local immigrant community is a necessary condition for 
supplying goods such as cheap bicycles and marijuana.  
Examples such as these are reminiscent of Mahler‟s (1995) study of immigrant 
life in poor neighbourhoods in the United States. She refers to the activities of 
„claveros‟ that obtain calling codes by „surfing‟ callers who use call cards at public 
phones, and who then sell these codes to other immigrants who use them for 
international phone calls: “They risk being caught for this line of business, but they 
risk never meeting their goals if they pursue a straight and narrow trajectory in the 
mainstream economy” (Mahler 1995: 152). Although not all immigrants make use of 
such illegal services, we could assert that such crimes are „functional‟ for parts of 
such ethnic communities, given the socio-economic circumstances of many of their 
members. Such offences are so closely connected with these communities that it may 
even be argued they are a feature of them.  
The second type of „embedded crimes‟ concerns illegal offenders who became 
delinquent as a consequence of having contacts with delinquent compatriots who 
reside in the Netherlands with residence permits. Some examples include an illegal 
immigrant that is recruited in Morocco by a Dutch-Moroccan owner of a coffee shop 
(reported by Engbersen et al. 1999, 219), and illegal immigrants from Colombia who 
were offered the opportunity by their countrymen to make some money in the cocaine 
business (reported by Zaitch 2002: 232). In such instances, delinquency among illegal 
immigrants is inflicted by delinquent legal immigrants: their involvement in crime 
could not have taken place without their „social capital‟, i.e., their contacts with 
delinquent countrymen who reside in the Netherlands with residence permits.  
  
The observation that the patterns of delinquency among legal and illegal immigrants 
overlap, but do not coincide completely, should be accounted for. It is plausible that 
both the relatively low use of violence by illegal offenders and their elevated use of 
false documents are connected with their precarious societal position in comparison 
with legal immigrants.
xviii
 Illegal immigrants face more difficulties in establishing 
themselves in the Netherlands in the first place, and for many illegal immigrants, 
deportation is always a threat (even though many apprehended illegal immigrants are 
not deported).
xix
 As a result, delinquency by illegal immigrants, if it occurs, appears to 
be more „prudent‟ and is primarily aimed at obtaining income - it is „instrumental‟ 
rather than „expressive‟ (cf. Radcliffe-Brown 1952: 143, Van San 1998).  It is also 
remarkable that the use of false documents appears to be most widespread among 
illegal „quartermasters‟ from ethnic groups that are relatively new to the Netherlands 
(Ethiopia, Iran, Afghanistan). Illegal immigrants from relatively settled ethnic groups 
(Turkey, Morocco, Surinam) may not require false documents to the same extent, for 
they probably have a higher chance to reside in the Netherlands for a while by 
invitation.
xx
 It is likely that the chances for acquiring a tourist visa also vary 
depending on applicants‟ nationalities.xxi  
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Discussion    
 
I have demonstrated that both the „quantity‟ and the „quality‟ of delinquency by 
illegal immigrants are associated with the involvement in crime of legal immigrants of 
comparable age and country of origin. The patterns of delinquency among legal and 
illegal immigrants overlap considerably, although illegal offenders make use of false 
documents more often than legal offenders do, and also appear to be engaged in 
violence and vandalism less frequently.  
On the basis of the available data differences in opinion on the interpretation 
of the evidence are still possible, and additional research is needed (especially on the 
individual level, and on immigrants older than 24). Given this empirical overlap, and 
given that variables besides social capital in the receiving country (such as cultural 
conditions and the availability of criminal resources in the country of origin), were 
drawn upon to explain delinquency among legal immigrants, additional variables 
should also be taken into consideration in order to account for illegal immigrants‟ 
involvement in crime. 
The literature in the field of crime and ethnicity, and the available 
ethnographic literature on illegal offenders, suggest that there is no straightforward 
negative connection between „social capital‟ and „delinquency‟. Several offences 
require specific forms of social capital. In this study, two types of „embedded crimes‟ 
were identified which illustrate that incorporation in ethnic communities can be 
associated positively with access to (ethnic) criminal „institutions‟ or circuits: (1) 
delinquent activities that are, arguably, „functional‟ for parts of poor immigrant 
communities of which delinquent illegal migrants are a part and in which they are 
embedded, and (2) delinquent activities by illegal immigrants who are incited to 
commit crimes by compatriots that reside in the Netherlands with residence permits. 
„Embeddedness‟ in ethnic communities can apparently be connected with all the three 
dimensions of the „differential opportunity structure‟, i.e., with formal, with informal, 
and with criminal „institutions‟ or circuits. This implies that insertion in ethnic 
communities does not have an unequivocal effect on illegal immigrants‟ involvement 
in crime; such incorporation only diminishes the chances of illegal immigrants 
embarking on criminal careers in the Netherlands in so far as the prevalence of 
delinquency in the ethnic communities is low. The chances of illegal immigrants 
engaging in criminal careers in the Netherlands, and the types of offences such 
delinquents may commit, vary with the involvement in crime of their legal 
compatriots. This is an important observation, since - as we have seen – involvement 
in crime appears to be common in some ethnic groups (especially among young 
males). 
  
There are, as I mentioned earlier, empirical indications in the Netherlands that illegal 
immigrants are increasingly engaging in various forms of crime. The findings of this 
study suggest that this growth may not (only) be a consequence of the exclusionist 
migration policies of recent years. The increase could also be due to a heightened 
prevalence of crime among legal immigrants in the Netherlands, as the survival 
chances of illegal immigrants increasingly depend on them. 
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Tables and figures 
 
Table 1. „Legal‟ suspects by country of birth and the corresponding group population 

















































































Morocco 2,360 2,030 24,855 23,548 9.1 8.7 8.9 
Turkey 749 580 22,450 19,980 3.1 2.9 3.0 
Surinam 1,049 942 16,550 14,565 6.4 6.2 6.3 
Yugoslavia 508 428 4,698 5,090 9.6 8.1 9.0 
Somalia 340 293 3,535 3,680 8.8 8.5 8.7 
Iraq 187 218 3,015 3,373 6.4 5.8 6.1 
China 44 59 2,533 3,098 1.8 1.0 1.4 
Afghanistan 67 78 2,143 2,860 2.9 2.6 2.8 
Soviet Union 191 274 1,910 2,423 10.7 6.7 8.6 
Iran 119 147 1,700 2,110 7.0 6.4 6.7 
Ethiopia 70 55 1,018 1,043 6.1 5.8 5.9 
Source: Kromhout and Van San (2003); Vreemdelingen Administratie Systeem 
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Table 2. Reasons for apprehension of illegal immigrants (18-24 yrs., 1998-2001) 












Morocco 3,008 1,065 1,943 35.4 
Turkey 1,216 197 1,019 16.2 
Surinam 223 131 92 58.7 
Yugoslavia 816 325 491 39.8 
Somalia 138 47 91 34.1 
Iraq 224 67 157 29.9 
China 423 88 335 20.8 
Afghanistan 90 28 62 31.1 
Soviet 
Union 1,281 427 854 33.3 
Iran 105 51 54 48.6 
Ethiopia 22 14 8 63.6 
Source: Vreemdelingen Administratie Systeem 
 
Table 3. Correlation coefficients between crime rates among legal and illegal 
immigrants in eleven ethnic groups; 1999-2000 (legal immigrants) and 1998-2001 
(illegal immigrants); 18-24 yrs.  
 Unweighted Weighted 
Unadjusted Data 0.34 (p<0.31) 0.57 (p<0.14) 
Adjusted Data A 0.42 (p<0.20) 0.74 (p<0.11) 
Adjusted Data B 0.37 (p<0.27) 0.67 (p<0.13) 
Without Surinam   
Unadjusted Data 0.39 (p<0.27) 0.78 (p<0.01) 
Adjusted Data A 0.44 (p<0.20) 0.76 (p<0.01) 
Adjusted Data B 0.42 (p<0.23) 0.78 (p<0.01) 
Without False Documents   
Unadjusted Data 0.53 (p<0.09) 0.40 (p<0.22) 
Adjusted Data A 0.58 (p<0.06) 0.43 (p<0.19) 
Adjusted Data B 0.55 (p<0.08) 0.41 (p<0.21) 
Without Surinam and 
False Documents  
  
Unadjusted Data 0.79 (p<0.01) 0.92 (p<0.00) 
Adjusted Data A 0.77 (p<0.01) 0.88 (p<0.00) 
Adjusted Data B 0.78 (p<0.01) 0.93 (p<0.00) 
Source: Kromhout and Van San (2003); Vreemdelingen Administratie Systeem 
 
Note: The weighted data are weighted according to the relative size of the immigrant 
community, with N=11, and N=10 without Surinam 
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Table 4. Types of offences committed by „legal‟ and „illegal‟ suspects. 1999-2000 
(legal immigrants) and 1998-2001 (illegal immigrants); 12-24 yrs.     





















(former) Yugoslavia 1,469 0.8 0 9.9 2.6 63.7 11.4 4.9 0.9 5.9 
Cramer's V=0,30 372 0.8 0 4.6 1.1 53 4.3 7.3 5.9 23.1 
Somalia 1,258 0.6 1 15.4 6 51.9 14.2 2.9 0.8 7.1 
Cramer's V=0,34 53 0 1.9 7.5 7.5 17 5.7 3.8 1.9 54.7 
Iraq 672 2.7 1 25.1 6 37.6 18 2.2 0.7 6.5 
Cramer's V=0,42 77 0 0 7.8 2.6 28.6 5.2 6.5 9.1 40.3 
China 126 0 0 24.6 7.1 38.9 5.6 10.3 0.8 12.7 
Cramer's V=0,49 123 0 0 16.3 3.3 16.3 0.8 5.7 0 57.7 
Afghanistan 191 5.8 4.2 23 1 33.5 17.3 7.3 0 7.9 
Cramer's V=0,74 26 0 0 3.8 0 0 0 0 0 96.2 
(former) Soviet Union 1,126 0.2 0 4.5 2.9 74.3 4.5 3.4 3.9 6.2 
Cramer's V=0,25 477 1.7 0 4.2 2.5 60.6 1.5 8.6 2.3 18.7 
Iran 504 1.2 0.6 18.7 6.7 39.5 19 4.6 2.8 6.9 
Cramer's V=0,54 58 0 0 5.2 0 13.8 3.4 10.3 3.4 63.8 
Ethiopia / Eritrea 205 1.5 0.5 13.7 12.7 38.5 14.1 7.3 1 10.7 
Cramer's V=0,49 16 0 0 0 0 18.8 0 0 6.3 75 
Total legal immigrants 5,551 1.1 0.6 13.6 4.6 55.3 12.3 4.1 1.6 6.8 
Total illegal immigrants 1,202 1 0.1 5.9 2.2 45.6 2.8 7.3 3.7 31.6 
Total ill. imm. (12-17) 162 0 0 5.6 4.3 46.3 3.1 4.3 3.7 32.7 
Total ill. imm. (18-24) 1,040 1.1 0.1 6 1.8 45.5 2.7 7.8 3.7 31.4 
Nationalities for which ‘quality’ of delinquency is not specified by Kromhout and van San 
Morocco 1,253 1.1 0.2 4.7 3.7 19.9 4.4 7.6 22.7 35.8 
Turkey 241 1.7 0.4 13.3 1.7 15.8 5.4 17 18.7 26.1 
Surinam 135 0 0 5.2 5.2 17 2.2 3 56.3 11.1 
 
Source: Kromhout and van San (2003:69) / Vreemdelingen Administratie Systeem 
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Figure 1. The crime rate among legal immigrants compared to crime rate indicators 
for their illegal counterparts; 18-24 yrs; 1999-2000 (legal immigrants); 1998-2001 
(illegal immigrants)  
Source: Kromhout and Van San (2003); Vreemdelingen Administratie Systeem 
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i Source: CBS Statline (www.statline.cbs.nl). The figures are for 2004. The „19 percent‟ includes first 
generation immigrants (born outside the Netherlands of non-Dutch parents) and second-generation 
immigrants (at least one parent born outside the Netherlands), and involves „westerse allochtonen‟ 
(immigrants from industrialized countries (N=1,419,855)) as well as „niet-westerse allochtonen‟ 
(immigrants from non-industrialized countries (N=1,668,297)).  
ii
 In the Netherlands, a housing permit is required for almost all (cheap) accommodation, except for 
rooms.  But even when an illegal immigrant rents a room or a bed, he cannot register at the 
municipality. Legal immigrants are not as systematically and thoroughly excluded from formal 
institutions as illegal immigrants are nowadays. Nevertheless, different categories of legal immigrants 
have different rights. Asylum seekers are generally speaking not allowed to work or to apply for 
unemployment benefits, but they do receive board and lodgings, and some „pocket-money‟. Labour 
migrants may, of course, work and, as a consequence, receive the social arrangements that are linked 
with it. Foreigners are admitted to the Netherlands as labour immigrants only if they possess skills for 
which a demand exists on the Dutch labour market, and there is no supply of employees from the EU 
available. Foreigners that migrate to the Netherlands because of family formation / reunification 
usually have the right to work, and are entitled to concomitant social arrangements when they lose their 
jobs or become ill. However, they cannot (as a rule) apply for unemployment benefits that are not 
related to work (Bijstand).     
iii
 Kehla (in Engbersen et al 1999) and Zaitch (2002) have already done some work in this direction.  
iv
 I selected countries from which the total number of legal immigrants aged 18 to 25, was greater than 
1000. 
v
 A hypothetical example can illustrate the adjustments made. Suppose Kromhout and Van San had 
counted a hundred suspects from a particular country of origin, and eighty suspects are legal 
immigrants and twenty illegal. However, Kromhout and van San could not distinguish between them 
with certainty using HKS. Suppose that out of these twenty illegal immigrants, ten told the police they 
resided in the Netherlands but concealed their precise residential addresses, five told the police they 
resided in the Netherlands and disclosed their addresses, and the remaining five told the police they did 
not reside in the Netherlands. In this case, Kromhout and van San would report ninety-five „legal‟ 
suspects (100-5), data adjustment A would lead to seventy-five „legal‟ suspects (twenty illegal 
immigrants would be subtracted from the number of „legal‟ immigrants reported by Kromhout and Van 
San), and adjustment B would lead to ninety „legal suspects‟ (only the five illegal immigrants that 
disclosed their residential addresses would be subtracted from the ninety-five „legal‟ suspects reported 
by Kromhout and Van San). In this example, the actual number of legal immigrants (80) lies between 
data adjustment A (75) and data adjustment B (90). 
vi
 Crime involvement varies with age. It tends to rise from 12 up to 18 or 19 years, and then slowly 
declines (cf. Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990). A general theory of crime. Stanford, Stanford University 
Press). To control for this correlation, age should be held constant (particularly because the share of 
minors may vary between ethnic groups and between legal and illegal immigrants). The alternative 
would be to present separate figures for legal and illegal immigrants aged 12 to 18. However, this 
would not make sense because few illegal immigrants are minors.    
vii
 This is not the same as the average number of suspects in 1999 and 2000 divided by the average size 
of the population, multiplied by a hundred. 
viii
 The data presented by Kromhout and Van San do not allow a specification according to sex and age 
at the same time. In the relevant age category (18 to 25 years of age), they do not present separate data 
on police registrations of male and female youngsters. 
ix
 Ethnic patterns of delinquency tend to be fairly constant within a time span of a few years (cf. Van 
San and Leerkes, 2001).  
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x
 This may constitute an underestimation of the actual number of illegal immigrants from Morocco. 
Some illegal immigrants from Morocco tell the police they were born in Algeria, because this obstructs 
their deportation from the Netherlands. Note, however, that this does not necessarily mean that the 
prevalence of delinquency among illegal Moroccans was underestimated, for it is a relative measure. It 
was only underestimated in as far as delinquent illegal Moroccans lie about their country of birth more 
often than non-delinquent illegal Moroccans did. 
xi
 By „criminal offences‟ I mean apprehensions in three categories usually distinguished by Engbersen 
et al.: „minor offences‟, „serious offences‟, and „drugs‟. 
xii
 Although the estimation of the total number of illegal immigrants constitutes the best available 
estimate, it is quite uncertain. The way illegal immigrants are apprehended and registered violates 
many theoretical assumptions that underlie the statistical estimation (see Engbersen et al. 2002 and 
Leerkes et al. 2004) 
xiii
 Type of crimes committed correlates with age (with more vandalism and less violence among 
minors). See also note vi and xvi.  
xiv
 This calculation was made for the total number of offences committed by offenders from the eight 
ethnic groups for which the „quality‟ of delinquency is specified. Hence Cramer‟s V was derived from 
a 2x9 cross-tabulation, i.e. residence status by type of offence.   
xv
 Goodman and Krushal Tau equals 0.02 (p<0.01) with type of offence dependent and 0.11 (p<0.01) 
with residence status dependent. This means that, given the association between residence status and 
type of offence, the error rate of the predictions of residence status is reduced by eleven percent when 
compared to random chance, while the error rate of the prediction of the offence category is diminished 
by only two percent. 
xvi
 Note that Cramer‟s V, calculated per ethnic group, correlates negatively with the respective crime 
rates among legal immigrants which were depicted in Table 1: from r=-0.67 / p<0.07 with adjusted 
crime rate A to r=-0.81 / p<0.02 with the unadjusted crime rate. Hence, the chance of illegal 
immigrants‟ crime involvement being limited to the use of false documents, and not extending to other 
offences, appears to rise as the crime involvement in the ethnic group as a whole decreases.    
xvii
 Without „False Documents‟, the unweighted correlation coefficients in Figure 1 are 0.53 (p<0.09), 
0.58 (p<0.06), and 0.55 (p<0.08) for the initial data, and data adjustment A and B. Similarly, without 
„False Documents‟ and without Surinam, the unweighted correlation coefficients are 0.79 (p<0.01), 
0.77 (p<0.01), and 0.78 (p<0.01). Without „False Documtents‟, the weighted correlation coefficients 
are 0.41 (p<0.21), 0.40 (p<0.22), and 0.43 (p<0.19). Without „False Documents‟ and without Surinam 
the weighted correlation coefficients are 0.92 (p<0.00), 0.88 (p<0.00), and 0.93 (p<0.00).  
xviii
 As can be seen in Table 5, the diminished share of violence cannot be due to the deviant age 
composition of the illegal population with fewer adolescents, since similar patterns prevail among 
illegal offenders aged 12 to 18 and 18 to 25. 
xix
 In the Netherlands, at least one third of the apprehensions of illegal immigrants does not result in 
deportation. Non-deported illegal immigrants either manage to conceal their identity, or their countries 
of origin did not co-operate (Engbersen et al. 2002).  
xx
 Most foreigners from non-western countries need such an invitation if they want to reside in the 
Netherlands for more than three months (this is called a MVV). The Dutch authorities link several 
(financial) responsibilities to such an invitation.   
xxi
 For example, in so far as there are group differences in applicants‟ financial resources that are 
related to their nationalities; applicants from poor countries, and applicants without sponsors such as 
family or friends in the Netherlands, are more likely to have insufficient financial resources).  
